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SUMMARY
The results of a summary assessment of foreign civil aviation competition as
it relates to the United States posture was undertaken to provide information
relating to long-term NASA aeronautical research and technology program
planning. Major findings were:
Main competitors.- European Economic Community (EEC)' and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics  USSR).
Largest commercial market.- Transport aircraft.
Current market status and projections.- U.S. currently dominates the
civil aviation market but foreign markets show g reater growth trends. The
future market is larqe and attractive.
Competitive comparisons.- Relative 1976 status comparisons are made in
technology aerodynamics, structures and materials, propulsion, avionics,
systems, design coordination, and manufacturing); production runs; marketing;
and post-sales support. The U.S. generally leads except in aerodynamics and
propulsion.
Potential newprojects.- A considerable number have been announced aimed
at traditiona U.S. markets.
Multi-national ventures.- Joint U.S. industry/foreign government develop-
ment of advanced technology^
	 engines is well developed. From the U.S. viewpoint,
multi-national ventures provide some advantages in that large development costs
and risks are reduced, and guaranteed access to the foreign partner's market
is obtained. Disadvantages foreseen are the creation of future competitors
through transfer of U.S. technology and dilution of the employment and sales
base.
Implications.- Although the U.S. is currently preeminent in most areas,
this may be only a temporary condition. The U.S. aviation industry is currently
'EEC - France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Bel qium, Netherlands,
Luxemburg, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.
in poor financial health and must compete with foreign governments who provide
financing to both their manufacturers and their airlines. Past U.S. success
in aviation has provided many benefits to the nation. These benefits will not
continue unless the U.S. aviation industry can resolve its major problems.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a summary assessment of foreign civil
aviation competition and to discuss some of the implications relative to the
U.S. aviation industry's current and future posture. This work was undertaken
in response to a request from the NASA Associate Administrator for Aeronautics
and Space Technology to: (1) provide information for long-range aeronautical
research and technology program planning, (2) respond to Congressional and
government agenc y questions on NASA activities,, and (3) aid the national
civil aviation industry which currently faces a number of very serious problems.
The importance of foreign competition to long-range R&T program planning is
discussed in reference 1.
SOURCES OF DATA AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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The data sources utilized consisted of:
o Articles from scientific and aviation trade magazines.
o Aerospace Industries Association statistics and studies.
o European Economic Co^imunity documents.
o Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed, United Technologies, and! General Electric
company documents and personal communications.
o Interviews and trip reports of NASA technical specialists.
o NASA documents and NASA technical translations of selected foreign
publications.
o USSR "Aviaexport" brochures.
o Defense Intelligence Agency/USAF reports and personal communications.
To present the study results in unclassified form, some technological compar-
sons are presented in a generalized fcrmat.
Acknowledgment is gratefully made to ainumber of technical experts from the
NASA Langley Research Center - AeronautIcs, Structures, and Electronics
Directorates - who served as contributors, consultants, and reviewers.
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DISCUSSION
Primary Aircraft Market
A variety of aircraft types and major markets nave been examined including
transports, general aviation, and helicopters. In some instances, it was
also necessary to consider military aircraft in order to scope and assess
the status and competitiveness of various aeronautical technologies.
Results presented in figure 1 (ref. 2) indicate that from 1961-1975 the
dollar value of U.S. transport aircraft deliveries was at least 3- to
4-times larger than that of general aviation and many times larger than
helicopter deliveries. Therefore, this paper has concentrated on the
transport category. Exports are seen to be increasingly important.
Main Competitors
The study reviewed aerospace industry data from the U.S., EEC, USSR, Japan,
and Canada. Detailed data on all nations studied was not always available.
However, the data did clearly indicate that the main competitors in the world's
aircraft market are the U.S., EEC, and the USSR. This result was reached using
data such as sales and employment, jet aircraft manufactured and recent aircraft
orders, major airline comparisons, and traffic history and predicted growth.
Sales and employment.- A comparison of aerospace (both civil and mili-
tary) employment from 1969 to 1973 and sales for 1974 is presented in figure
2 (refs. 2-6) for the main free-world, competitors. The three major U.S.
airframe manufacturers employ about 45,300 people on civil work, down from
126,000 in 1968. The Russian aerospace industry employs about 900,000
people.
The U.S. level of employment was dpproximately two and one-half (2-1/2) times
larger in 1973 than that of the EEC and many times larger than Canada and
Japan. In the case of sales, the difference is even greater. Employment and
sales levels of U.S. civil aviation are clearly large contributors to the
gross national product.
Jet aircraft deliveries.- A comparison of total jet transport deliveries
(as of 1974) for the U.S., EEC, and USSR is presented in table I. These data
indicate that the U.S. had orders for 4,613 aircraft as compared to 859 for
the EEC during the 1958-1974 time period. The USSR, whose market is primar-
ily limited ti the Warsaw Pact nations, had orders for a total of over 1,228
aircraft. Most U.S. aircraft have had sizable production runs which increase
the possibility of recovering research and development cost, making profits,
and lowering unit price via learning curve economics. In contrast, none of
the EEC aircraft have broken the 300-aircraft sales level. Earlier USSR air-
craft were generally of low production levels but the more recent YAK40 has
reached the 600 level and is expected eventually to reach levels on the order
of 1,400 (ref. 8).
Recent aircraft orders (1974-1975) for U.S. aircraft and the EEC A-300 Airbus
are listed in table II (i.e., ref. 7). There were critical declines in nearly
r
all orders for listed U.S. aircraft from 1974 to 1975 and a significant
increase in A-300 orders. This suggests that the EEC - through careful
planning, consortium manufacturing, and government financing - may be
capable of making in-roads into U.S. markets. Concorde production authori-
zation is presently limited to 16 copies.
Airline comparison.- A comparison of salient statistical characteristics
of the competitive communities' major airlines is presented in table III
(refs. 2, 6, and 9). The data include percent of state ownership, revenue
passenger miles (RPM), passenger traffic, and employment. It should be noted
that all of the foreign flag lines are largely state owned and financed. The
U.S. had the highest RPM and passenger movements; the USSR, second; EEC, third;
Canada, fourth; and Japan, the lowest.
Productivity of the various airlines, as measured by RPM per airline employee,
indicates that Air Canada is highest; U.S., second; Japan, third; EEC, fourth;
and USSR, last. The U.S., EEC, and USSR are the prime movers of traffic.
Traffic growth.- An illustration of the world's traffic growth in terms
of revenue passenger miles is presented in figure 3 (ref. 9). Actual statis-
tics for the years 1968 through 1974 are shown, as are predictions for the
total International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) members. The ICAO
curve is cumulative and the rest are absolute. "Other" ICAO member data are
not presented in the interest of clarity. The insert table provides both the
actual compound growth rates, for 1968-1974, and the projected 1975-1986 (low
and high) estimated growth rates. These projections seem to agree with the
generally accepted opinion that the airline industry is approaching maturity
(i.e., growing only a little faster than the economy as a whole). An up-to-
date analysis of future aircraft needs is contained in reference 10.
The estimated size of the market from 19'6-1986 is also presented i n figure 3.
These simple estimates were derived from published market values in 1974
(ref. 11) and assumed that the future fleet mix would be approximately the
same as in 1974.
The total market for the 1976-1986
to $100-billion (USSR included).
free-world industry, the market is
$80-billion. The largest share of
to $33-billion), with the EEC next
future markets are large and worth
time period is estimated to be from $80-
If the USSR market is not available to the
still estimated to be between $65- to
the market will be in the U.S. (from $27-
highest ($20- to $24-billion). Thus,
striving to attain.
Aeronautical Technology Comparisons
In compar i ng the status of the competitors in prime aeronautical technical
disciplines such as aerodynamics, propulsion, structures and materials, and
avionics, an attempt has been made to utilize meaningful quantitative rela-
tionships. These relationships are not an absolute measure of technology
status, since individual disciplines are compromised by the many trades
necessary in any aircraft design.
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Aerodynamics.- A comparison of subsonic aerodynamic efficiency, as
illustrated bylift-to-drag (L/D) ratio and Mach number (M) times L/D (M L/D),
for representative U.S., EEC, and USSR transport aircraft is presented in
figure 4. J.S. aircraft considered include: the Boeing 707-320C, 727-200,
737-100, and 747-100. EEC aircraft include the Airbus Industries A-300-B2;
British Aircraft Corporation BAC-111-475; Hawker-Siddeley Trident Super 3B;
and Vereingte Flugtechnische Werke-Fokker VFW-614. USSR aircraft include the:
Tupole TU-134A and TU-154; and the Iluyshin IL-62 and IL-86.
Inasmuch as neither published performance data nor the necessary detailed
geometric data (required to conduct a rigorous analysis) were available for the
foreign aircraft, a simplified method was employed to estimate aerodynamic
efficiency. The procedure consisted of utilizing published (,vane's All-the-
World Aircraft) cruise speed, range, payload, fuel load, reserve fuel, and
cruise specific fuel consumption data to derive the lift-to-drag ratios. The
method was checked against more accurate data (ref. 12) and the results agreed
within five percent.
The L/D of a modern airplane is selected on the basis of overall performance
and economic trades, anO is therefore not a completely reliable indicator of
aerodynamic technology. Indeed, some of the more recent airplanes actually
have lower L/D's than the early Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 airplanes. A
better indicator is the comparison of airplane L/D with the ideal L/D obtained
r.	 by considering only skin friction and induced drag. Ideal L/D depends princi-
pally on the ratio of wing span, (b), to the square root of configuration wetted
area, Q' wet ).
   The ideal lift-to-drag  rati o appropriate to the aircraft U'l
consideration (for cruise altitude above 36,000 feet and Mach number from 0.7
to 0.85) is also presented in figure 4.
L/D comparisons indicate that the data correlates in a band represented by
13.7 (	 b	 )± 8%. U.S. aircraft are general l y on the mid-to-high side of
we
the correlation and vary from 71-to-19 percent of the ideal L/D values. The
EEC aircraft (69-to-77 percent of ideal L/D) and USSR aircraft (67-to-76
percent of ideal L/D) are located on the mid-to-low side of the correlation.
A partial explanation of these results is provided by the plot of M(L/D) versus
design range and a study of the aircraft wing loading characteristics. In
general, the U.S. aircraft have higher design ranges, hiaher wing loadings, and
higher differences in initial and final wing loadings and are therefore less
compromised for the off-design takeoff and landing conditions than are the short-
to-medium range EEC and USSR aircraft. The reasons for the lower than expected
efficiency of the USSR long-range aircraft are not fully understood although it
is presumed to be associated with the four aft mounted engine design which
probably causes balance problems and trim-drag penalties.
Although the U.S. aircraft are indicated to have somewhat higher efficiency
levels, differences in design approach offers a possible explanation for the
aerodynamic differences since compromise for short, unprepared or rough fields,
extreme cold weather operation, and centralized maintenance facilities could be
responsible. These conditions suggest that the aerodynamic efficiency levels
are on a par worldwide.
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Engines.- A comparison of engine technology is presented in figure 5
(refs.°3^	 f, 4). Takeoff specific fuel consumption (SFC) and maximum static
engine thrust-to-Height ratios are plotted as a function of engine intro-
duction date. Levels of performance for the U.S. and EEC are assessed to
be essentially ±ne same and are shown as the shaded bands.
With regard '.o thrust-to-weight ratio, the USSR also has a comparable level
of technology. For SFC, the USSR is assessed to be 2 to 4 years behind the
U.S. and EEC - primarily because they do not, as yet, utilize the same high
level of turbine-inlet temperature. This could be either a deliberate design
philosophy to minimize reliability and maintenance problems, and/or a result of
problems with metallics or cooling techniques. In any event, the comparison
shows a closer parity than presented in previous studies (ref. 14) and
indicates that the USSR is closing the gap in propulsion technology.
The USSR now has a high bypass ratio (5:32) engine in the 14,000-pound thrust
class (ref. 15) that is being used in the YAK-42 short-haul aircraft. There is
no indication that the USSR has as yet developed a high bypass ratio -high
thrust engine (;z:50,000 pound). There are indications that the USSR is
negotiating with Rolls-Royce for RB-211 high bypass ratio- high thrust engines.
Reports from U.S. airlines utilizing both U.S. and Rolls-Royce engines indicate
that the RB-211 has a superior capacity to retain a given level of specific fuel
consumption and also shows rapidly improving reliability. A recent article
(ref. 16) states that a new Rolls-Royce engine (RB-401) has an advanced combus-
tion chamber design which reduces emission levels to 1979 standards (the first
such claim). Also, both the EEC and USSR have engines to power their SST's,
whereas the U.S. has no comparable engine.
Structures and materials.- A comparison of structural performance is
presented in figure 6 ref. 17). The gross measure of structural efficiency
utilized is structural-weight-to-aircraft-surface-wetted area as a function
of aircraft weight. The U.S. and EEC aircraft are shown as open symbols and
the USSR aircraft are 	 by solid symbols. The line fairings repre-
sent least-square curve fits to the individual aircraft data.
For takeoff gross weights under 200,000 pounds, free-world aircraft are
considerably lighter than USSR aircraft. This is partly the result of a USSR
design approach which configures aircraft for dual military/civil roles, and
for austere terminal characteristics. At the higher gross weights, the
pronounced convergence of the data indicate a nearly equal technology level.
A qualitative assessment of other structural areas is presented in figure 7.
Regarding the mechanics of behavior of composites, all competitors are assessed
to be on a par. With regard to composite applications, the U.S. is considered
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to lead as a result of extensive DOD and NASA programs; the EEC lags because
t of funding limitations, Japan lags, and the USSR status is unknown.
in fatigue phenomen.a , the U.S. is thought to be ahead in experience and in
application to long-life aircraft, although all parties are believed to possess
the same basic level of understanding. With regard to fracture mechanics, the
U.S. is estimated to be advanced, the EEC and Japan to be at a level sufficient
to met U.S. certification requirements, and the USSR known to have eminent
analysts (applications of their work are largely unknown).
In polymers, the U.S. and EEC appear on par and the USSR a pears to lag. In
adhesive bonding, the U.S. does use this (i.e. L-1011 skin but manufacturers
generally prefer extrusions to reduce cost; the EEC, particularly the Netherlands,
has made extensive use of adhesive bonding in the F-27 and t-28 aircraft;
there is some indication that the USSR is using this technology but the extent
is not known.
In production manufacturing, the U.S. leads in automation, the EEC is begin-
ning serious automation, the Japanese industry is largely untried in trans-
port aircraft, and the USSR is seeking to buy ready-made western world
capability.
In large press development, which could lead to major breakthroughs in manu-
facturing processes, the USSR leads with machines of 75,000 metric-ton
capability. With this press, the USSR has produced much larger forgings than
have previously been demonstrated. The French have bought a 65,000 metric-
ton press from the USSR. In this important area, the U.S. is assessed to
lag since the largest press known is 45,000 metric-tons; substitute manufac-
turing techniques include diffusion bonding and thin sheet usage.
Avionics.- A qualitative assessment of -the status in some of the avionics
technology areas is presented in figure 8.
The U.S. is considered to lead in air traffic control systems (refs. 4, 18)
because the U.S. has a nationally unified system developed by the Federal
Aviation Administration. The EEC has no effective unified system (because
of individual national viewsr although several of the EEC members produce
excellent systems. The USSR and Japan have no known advanced system. The
Japanese have purchased U.S. systems. The USSR was denied permission to
'purchase U.S. systems because the technology could be utilized to increase
military capability.
With regard to navigation systems, the U.S. is assessed to lead because of
its advanced satellite, inertial, gyro, and VOR/DME area navigation capability.
The EEC is also known to have a superior area navigation capability. The
USSR is not known to have navigation satellite capability as yet, although
there is intensive activity on inertial systems.
In terminal area research, the U.S. is considered to lead as the NASA/FAA/
industry cooperative Terminal Configured Vehicle program (ref. 19) is
assessed to be the most advanced, both in scope of activity and in flight
demonstration equipment. The EEC is known to have advanced research both
s'	 7
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underway (UK) and contemplated (France). The status of USSR and Japanese work
is not known.
The USSR prefers adoption of a scanning-beam microwave landing system (MLS)
similar to the MLS proposal which the U.S. made to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ref. 20).
Active controls.- Figure 9 presents a qualitative assessment of the status
(ref. 2172-4-T of some active control technology areas.
The U.S. is considered to lead in basic research with much work underway; the
EEC is competitive and the USSR is thought to be competitive. The United
Kingdom is strong in fly-by-wire hardware (i.e. - development and production of
digital flight control system for the Boeing YC-14) and France and West Germany
have major wind tunnel efforts going on (models used are generally not as
sophisticated as are U.S. models). The USSR closely monitors the results of
Western wcrk and has its own studies of relaxed static stability and other areas
ongoing. Presently, Japan has little interest in this work and is thought to
have only minor work underway.
The U.S. leads in flight testing active controls (B-52, B-58, XB-70, C-5A, F-4,
F-8, YF-16, F-111, F-104, L-1011, and 747) and is pursuing relaxed static
stability, gust-load alleviation, yaw damping, and fly-by-wire technology
(ref. 25). The EEC has a smaller overall effort but has applied a degree of
relaxed stability to the Concorde, is working fly-by-wire (W. Germany: F-104G;
U.K.: Hunter; Sweden: Viggen) and has plans for flutter tests. The USSR is
known to have made flight tests of active controls and is thought to be in a
competitive position with the U.S. Japan has not made any flight tests and is
without a strong incentive to do so without a major aircraft development
program ongoing.
In applications, the U.S. has placed an active load distribution control system
on the C-5A, and the 747 and L-1011 have yaw dampers. The EEC has used an
autostabilizer on Concorde for relaxed static stability and to move fuel around.
Russian applications are unknown.
Overall, the U.S. is assessed to be somewhat ahead in active controls tc=uauss of
strong past (military, civil, and space program spinoffs) and curren'. !fforts.
The EEC and USSR are assessed to be competitive with the U.S. and possess the
ability for applying the technology to future aircraft, and Japan is ;fell behind
the U.S.
1976 Competitive Situation
A summary of the aerospace industry competitive status (in 1976) is presented
in figure 10.
In discipline technology, the U.S. is assessed to be predominant; the EEC is
estimated to be somewhat lagging in a few areas. The USSR is assessed to be
6
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somewhat behind in structures, although this judgment must be tempered by
uncertainties as to whether USSR aircraft reflect a deliberate design philosophy
slanteJ towards civil/military commonality and rough fic,d capability. The
USSR is assessed to be weak in other areas although there are indications that
these weaknesses are recognized and that efforts are being made to correct them.
The Japanese are currently assessed to have little commercial aircraft develop-
ment capability and will require approximately 10-15 years of effort to develop
such capability. The U.S. is relatively strong in the development of major
aircraft systems and often sells this equipment to EEC aircraft manufacturers.
Another U.S. strong point is the close coordination which exists between air-
line customers and airframe/engine manufacturers during the development and
design of a new aircraft.
In the length of production run, the U.S. and USSR are assessed to be strong
and the EEC is assessed to be weak 	 The U.S. manufacturing position is
fundamentally dependent on the ti fic moved by U.S. airlines. The Japanese
capability for building complete large aircraft is essentially nonexistent,
although they have some experience with the YS-11 and have been building wing
flaps for the B-747 SP (ref. 26).
i
With regard to business aspects, the U.S. is curr
with respect 'Co both the USSR and the EEC because
of the U.S. industry which is suffering from lack
capital, and a national plan to effect recovery.
government capital available to them when needed,
on their own resources.
ently assessed to be weak
of the poor financial health
of adequate profit, available
Foreign firms also have
whereas U.S. firms must rely
In marketing, the U.S. has demonstrated outstanding strength in post-sales
support including collaboration on operational problems as well as prompt
spare parts availability, whereas the other participants have not performed
as well.
Typical foreign government ownership of airlines and manufacturers puts great
pressure (and sometimes a directed procurement policy) on airlines to buy their
own national products. At times, however, EEC airlines have bought competing
U.S. aircraft rather than purchase an inferior product manufactured locally.
Existing Competitive Aircraft and New Projects
F	 A comparison of existing and prototype transport aircraft projects for various
market categories is presented in figure 11 (also see table I). As a further
aid in identifying foreign aircraft, photographs and pertinent characteristics
are presented in figure A-1 through A-14 of the Appendix. Both the EEC and
USSR have projects in nearly all of the range-payload categories traditionally
dominated by the U.S. It is important to note that both the EEC and USSR have
'	 SST's (figures A-1 and A-2) in scheduled service, while the U.S. does not.
I
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The EEC is considering a number of derivative versions of an A-300 aircraft
(figures 12, A-3). A 'long-range version, designated the A-300 B-11, is being
carefully studied by airlines such as Aero-Lingus (ref. 27) and Lufthansa.
The USSR announced (ref. 28) that it has a p rototype medium-range wide-body
transport, the Iluysnin IL-86 (figure A-4), being flight tested and a second
prototype which will b, in tests late in 1976. The USSR has historically taken
an excessive amount of time to place a new aircraft in service (from the first
flight). The YAKOLEV YAK-42 (figure A-11), a larger and improved aircraft
similar to the YAK-40 (figure A-14) is apparently intended to be a short-range
aircraft in the DC-9 and B-737 class. Estimates have been made that Aeroflot
Anticipates a need for about 2,000 YAK 42's (ref. 29).
	
It utilizes the first
known USSR high bypass ratio (5:32) engine. YAK-42 passenger accomodations are
similar to a Western world airplane.
An estimated schedule of other potential aircraf° project introduction dates is
presented in figure 12. The solid symbols denote recent introductions and the
open symbols denote planned introductions. Of interest is the large number of
recently introduced EEC and USSR aircraft (1975-1977) and the number of planned
EEC introductions in the 1978-1979 time period. Although some derivatives (i.e.
7N7 - a derivative of existing narrow-body jets, DC-10-X models) of existing
U.S. aircraft are possible, advanced projects such as the Boeing 7X7, the Douglas
DC-X-200, and the Lockheed Reduced Energy RE-1011 are not expected to be intro-
duced until the early 1980's, or later.
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a single competitor can afford the high expected development cost ($4B + ) and
it is possible that an international consortium between the U.S. and EEC will
result. It is estimated that the earliest introduction date for an advanced
SST is in the latter-half of the 19801s.
Problem Areas
Multinational ventures.- The U.S. aviation industry is currently exper-
iencing an extremely difficult time in acquiring the financing needed to under-
take new aircraft developments. As a result, U.S. firms are already undertaking
cooperative ventures with foreign firms and planning even more extensive
projects. Some examples are listed in figure 13. Inasmuch as foreign com-
panies are largely government owned and financed, U.S. companies are essentially
dealing with foreign governments. While U.S. firms can team with foreign
communities, they are restricted from doing likewise with other U.S. firms because
s '	 of antitrust laws. Foreign competitors also either have (USSR) or are beginning
(EEC) unified aviation plans and coordinated policies (ref. 30). The U.S. has
no such policy to guide the industry, although one serious attempt was made
to formulate such a plan (see ref. 31).
A prime example of a multinational aeronautical project is the JT10-D effort
illustrated in figure 13 (ref. 32). The various companies involved are Pratt
and Whitney (54 percent share of development cost), Rolls-Royce (34 percent),
Motor Turbine Union (9 percent), and Fiat (2 percent). Other ongoing activi-
ties include the CFM-56, General Electric and SNECMA (France); the 7X7, Boeing
10
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and Aeritalia. (Italy); DC-10 derivative, Douglas and UK; and the A-300, Air-
bus Industries and General Electric. Projects now under discussion are:
7X7, Boeing and Japan; DC-9-QST, Boeing and Japan; DCX-200, Douglas and France;
A-3006 (advanced), Boeing and Airbus Industries; and the 7N7, Boeing and
France.
An important reason why foreign countries can successfully press for a share of
new aircraft production is because the relative importance of U.S. airlines is
shrinking. As indicated in figure 14, the U.S. share of the revenue passenger
miles has decreased from approximately 70 percent in 1960 to about 45 percent
in 1975. Large scale joint production agreements may reduce U.S. aerospace
employment, which has already decreased from about 1-112 million people in
1968 to about 921,000 people in 1975 (fig. 15). The significant question is
whether U.S. employment is maximized by projects which share markets and jobs
with foreign nations or by continued U.S. dominance in transport markets
(which implies that the U.S. insure that American firms are able to develop
new aircraft independent of foreign governments).
From the U.S. viewpoint, multinational ventures provide some advantages in that
large development costs and risks are reduced, and guaranteed access to the
foreign partner's market is obtained. Disadvantages foreseen are the creation
of future	 npetitors through transfer of U.S. technology(this is particularly
signific	 yen foreign research and development efforts grow faster than U.S.
efl , rt
	and dilution of the employment and sales base.
Another- problem area of concern to U.S. airframe and engine companies - and to
NASA by virtue of its charter role in ;maintaining an advanced U.S. aeronautics
research and technology base - is the size of the NASA aeronautics funding level
(as contrasted to what the industry believes is needed), and the importance of
the U.S. advanced technology base to maintaining a large volume of aerospace
exports.
Figure 16 presents the total NASA aeronautics funding level, the research and
technology (R&T) base (in both current and 1976 constant dollars), and overall
NASA R&D funding for the period from 1967 to 1977. Aeronautics funding has
shown a continued rise to over $188 million in fiscal year 1977. Major airframe
and engine manufacturers indicate that to maintain U.S. preeminence, an aero-
nautics funding level of approximately $1 billion per year is required. A
port ion of this funding is needed to insure that effective industry research
and design teams are kept together. Such an involvement has been underway for
z	 several years in the NASA Supersonic Cruise Aircraft Research (SCAR) program
(ref. 33), at a relatively low level, and another such venture is evolving in
the NASA/Industry Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) program (ref. 34).
Another point of interest is that the R&T funding share has decreased from over
80 percent in 1967 to approximately 50 percent in 1976. Basically, R&T fuiding
is a long-term investment in ideas which have high payoff provided enough
information is eventually gathered to reduce the risk of innovation to accept-
able levels. The past funding trend has been helpful to near-term systems
technology and experimental programs but of less help to long-term basic
research.
Some military development programs also provide benefits to civil aviation.
However, emergence of problems such as aircraft noise and much more expensive
fuel mean that civil aviation applications of military technology are now much
less frequent than was true in the past. This additional problem makes increased
R&T funding even more important.
r1l
Additional Topics Needing Study
This work also identified a number of other areas needing study and analysis.
A partial list follows:
Long-term impact of multinational project development.
European technology areas advanced by the development of the Concorde.
Essential elements of a national aviation policy.
- Impact of continued U.S. civil market dominance on EEC behavior.
CONCLUSIONS
A study of competitive aspects of foreign civil aviation indicates the following
conclusions:
1., The U.S. currently dominates the market for manufacture of commercial
aircraft. It is questionable whether this will continue in the future.
2. Transport aircraft represent the largest share of the civil aviation,
market, both today and in the foreseeable future.
3. There is a large future market, estimated to be from $80-$100 billion
from 1976-1986 (if the USSR is included), and from $65-$80 billion if the USSR
market is inaccessible.
4. The primary competitors to the U.S. are the EEC in the near term and
the USSR in the long term. Both of these competitors:
o are developing or acquiring advanced technology capabilities
o are planning future aircraft projects
o lead in supersonic transport experience
o have made major technological breakthroughs in the past and
probably will do so in the future
o probably cannot challenge the U.S. across-the-board but can
take 'a part of each market away.
5. Under present policies, multinational projects will proliferate in
the future because there are advantages for both U.S. firms and for foreign
partners. U.S. companies need development money, risk-sharing, and foreign
market access. Foreign partners need U.S. technology and business know-how.
Such arrangements have long-term risk to the U.S. in that they create
future competitors, transfer hard-earned U.S. technology, and dilute U.S.
sales and employment levels. U.S. companies now deal with foreign governments
anc, firms regularly but cannot effectively cooperate with each other.
6. Continued U.S. preeminence is dependent on superior products which
will require larger budgets for both the necessary long-term research and
technology work and near-term systems technology programs.
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(10*
ORIGINAL PAGE M
OF POOR QUALITY
A300
B2 E4 B9 B10 B11
TOGW	 (lbs) 313,055 330,700 320,000 300,000 390,000
Pass 269 269 336 214 197
RANGE	 n.mi. 1510 2200 1200 2200 6000
1L
.8 .8 .8 .8 .8
R
Lngine 2	 x 51,000	 lb CF6-50C 2	 x 53,40',	 lb 2 x 45,000 lb 4 x 22,000 lb
CF6-50C CF6-50L CF6-45 CFM-56
SFC
	
(T-0) .394 .394 .398
4
Figure A-3. - Airbus Industries A300 B4 aircraft.
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